The State of Utah v. Daniel Barlow : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
The State of Utah v. Daniel Barlow : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Susanne Gustin-Furgis; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; attorney for appellant.
Nick M D\'Alesandro; Deputy District Attorney; attorneys for appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Barlow, No. 940432 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6085
Case No. 940432-CA 
Priority No. 2 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL BARLOW, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
0000O0000 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from judgment and conviction for CARRYING A 
CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial 
Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Murray 
Department, the Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding. 
SUSANNE GUSTIN-FURGIS, #5962 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
NICK M. D'ALESANDRO 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorney for Appellee 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
.F 
r 
K f J 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. qwn? 
FILED 
\m 1S1595 
r\r\i IDT f*P L 
Case No. 940432-CA 
Priority No. 2 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0000O0000 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL BARLOW, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
0000O0000 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from judgment and conviction for CARRYING A 
CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial 
Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Murray 
Department, the Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding. 
SUSANNE GUSTIN-FURGIS, #5962 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
NICK M. D'ALESANDRO 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I. STATE HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF PLAIN 
VIEW AND OTHER WARRANT EXCEPTIONS AS A 
BASIS TO SEARCH BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT 
CROSS APPEAL THESE ISSUES 2 
POINT II. OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO CONDUCT TERRY FRISK OF CAR. . . . . . . . .3 
POINT III. STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEFORE SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT 5 
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 5 
B. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS. 8 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Pages 
People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1988) 3,4 
People v. Stewart, 420 N.W.2d 180 (Mich.App. 1988) 5 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) 6 
State v. Brown, 598 So.2d 565 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992) 5 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) 7 
State v. Hvgh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 6 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 5 
State v. Lee, 485 So.2d 555 (La.App. 5Cir. 1986) 4 
State v. South, 251 Utah Adv.Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1994) 2,7 
State v. Stricklina, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992) 3,8 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 
61 L.Ed.2d 235 8 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) • 1,8 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 
53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) 8 
United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1988) 3,4 
United States v. Maestas, 941 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1991) 3,4 
United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 
72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) 8 
United States v. To Rav Tan. 701 F.Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y 1988) . . .3,4 
iii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DANIEL BARLOW, : Case No. 940432-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant DANIEL BARLOW relies on his opening brief 
and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant 
responds as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to raise the issue of whether the fannypack 
was in plain view on cross appeal, therefore the Court may not 
consider this issue. The officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Barlow was armed and dangerous, therefore a 
Terry search of his automobile was illegal. See Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Both the state and 
federal constitutions require probable cause plus exigent 
circumstances before a search without a warrant is justified. In 
the case at bar, neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances 
were present to justify a search of the car. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF PLAIN VIEW AND OTHER WARRANT 
EXCEPTIONS AS A BASIS TO SEARCH BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT 
CROSS APPEAL THESE ISSUES 
The State alluded to the argument that the fannypack could be 
seized under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement 
because the fannypack "was identified as the type specifically used 
to conceal a weapon." Appellee's brief at 8. 
The State has failed to cross appeal this issue and has 
therefore waived it. State v. South, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah 
App. 1994) deals with this exact issue. The Court stated: 
When an issue is squarely presented to and ruled on by 
the trial court, a party should raise the issue either on 
direct or cross appeal and not wait until the briefing 
stage of the appeal to raise the issue. . . [b] ecause the 
State did not take issue with the trial court's ruling on 
the validity of the search warrant by filing a cross 
appeal, we decline to consider the issue. 
The plain view issue was "squarely presented to and ruled on 
by the trial court". Defense counsel specifically asked the court 
for a ruling on the plain view exception. Defense counsel: "So 
you're not going on the plain view [exception] (court reporter 
mistranscribed as "of exception"). The court responded, "[n]ot at 
all". The trial judge found that the fannypack was not "clearly 
incriminating." M. Tr. 114. 
Judge Burton also made a finding that this was not a search 
incident to arrest. "All right. I think it's clear here that this 
is not a search subsequent to arrest, granted they were in custody, 
but none of the officers said they were looking in this vehicle 
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because they had arrested them. It's not an impound search, it's 
not an inventory search. There clearly was no consent." M. Tr. 
112. The State did not cross appeal the judge's ruling on any of 
these exceptions, therefore they are waived and the only issue 
before this Court is whether the officers could search the vehicle 
pursuant to the safety exception to the warrant requirement. 
POINT II 
OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONDUCT 
TERRY FRISK OF CAR 
The State cites United States v. Lecro, 855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 
1988) and People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1988) in support 
of its argument that even if a suspect is securely in police 
custody, an officer may conduct a search of his vehicle for safety 
purposes. State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992), also 
cites U.S. v. To Ray Tan, 701 F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1988) and U.S. v. 
Maestas, 941 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1991) . Besides the fact that these 
cases are not controlling, these cases can be distinguished from 
the case at bar. 
In all of these cases, the officers clearly had reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect(s) were armed and dangerous. In 
Melgosa, the officers responded to a burglary call. One of the 
occupants made a furtive movement while seated in the car (either 
reaching for something or placing something under the seat). The 
officers patted down the occupants before searching the car. It is 
also important to note that the officers had reasonable suspicion 
tying the car to a weapon--a furtive movement. 
In fact in all the cases cited in Stricklinq, there has been 
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a furtive movement made by one of the occupants of the car while 
that person was seated in the car. The officer had reason to 
believe that there may be a weapon in the car. In the case at bar, 
there were no furtive movements in the cars at the scene. The 
cars, then, should not have been searched without probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. See discussion infra in "Point III." 
Compare the level of reasonable suspicion and precautions 
taken by officers before the search in these cases. Melgosa, 753 
P. 2d at 223 (dispatch on burglary, suspects ordered out of the car, 
patdown of suspects, furtive movement in car); To Ray Tan 701 F. 
Supp. at 46-47 (DEA agents dealing with known drug dealers, furtive 
movement in car, officers draw weapons, suspects guarded but could 
break away from police custody); Maestas, 941 F.2d 275 (burglary 
call, suspect drunk & threatening, suspect said he had a gun in his 
truck, suspect said he'd kill woman at scene, suspect makes furtive 
movement in truck); Lego, 855 F.2d 543 (known drug dealer making 
drug stops, furtive movement in truck, officer draws weapon & does 
complete patdown of suspect, knife found on suspect). 
Defendant urges this Court to require that a warrant be 
obtained before search of a vehicle for weapons when there is no 
immediate threat to the officers or surrounding members of the 
public like the following courts have done: 
Louisiana: Officers cannot search vehicle for weapons 
which had been stopped for suspected drug activity when 
occupants were cooperative and had been removed from the 
scene. State v. Lee, 485 So.2d 555 (La.App. 5 Cir. 
1986) . 
During questioning outside of shed, murder suspect 
informs officers that he has .22 caliber rifle inside the 
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shed. Held: Officers illegally seized rifle based upon 
safety exception to warrant requirement because defendant 
was not near shed when it was seized. State v. Brown, 
598 So.2d 565 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992). 
Michigan: Officers cannot search purses of suspects for 
weapons when officers have control of the purses and 
suspects were isolated in a central location with no 
access to the purses. People v. Stewart, 420 N.W.2d 180 
(Mich.App. 1988). 
POINT III 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE 
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT 
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The State argued that the Defendant's state constitutional 
analysis was inadequate. Appellee's Brief at 7. Defendant's state 
constitutional analysis was more than adequate (see Appellant's 
Brief, 12-16), however, Defendant will "beef up" his analysis 
anyway. In State v. Larocco, under an article I section 14 state 
constitutional analysis, the Utah Supreme Court addresses the need 
for officers to obtain a warrant before a search unless the 
officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 at 
468, 470 (Utah 1990). 
Although Larocco deals with the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement, the Larocco Court also discusses the safety 
exception to the warrant requirement in its state constitutional 
analysis: 
[I]f article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches 
will be permitted only where they satisfy their 
traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety 
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of police of the public or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. . . see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). 
Larocco also quoted Justice Zimmerman in State v. Hvcrh, 711 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J. concurring): 
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the officers 
with concealed weapons or will destroy evidence is gone, 
there is no persuasive reason why the officers cannot 
take the time to secure a warrant. Such a requirement 
would present little impediment to police investigations, 
especially in light of the ease with which warrants can 
be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, 
U.C.A., 1953, sec. 7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.). 
In the case at bar, neither probable cause nor exigent 
circumstances were present. The officers had no evidence to 
suspect that the car contained evidence of stolen goods, drugs or 
weapons. No one was seen making any furtive movements in the car. 
As for any exigent circumstances, they were not present either. 
The suspects were handcuffed and removed from the scene. They were 
a danger to no one. In these circumstances, the officers could 
have easily obtained a warrant by telephone and then proceeded to 
search the car. 
State v. Beavers1, 859 P. 2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), also discusses 
the need for probable cause and exigent circumstances before a 
search can be conducted without a warrant. In Beavers, the Court 
of Appeals defined exigent circumstances: 
Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a 
1
 The Utah Court of Appeals in Beavers also held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not permit a warrantless entry into a 
residence on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion--the 
level of suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory Terry 
stop. Such an entry is justified only on the basis of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. 
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reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was 
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or 
other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement 
efforts. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 
(9th Cir.) , cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 
L.Ed. 2d 46 (1984) . The need for an immediate search must 
be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh 
the important protection of individual rights provided by 
the warrant requirement. United States v. Robertson, 606 
F.2d 853, 859 (9th cir. 1979). 
According to this definition, there were no exigent 
circumstances in the case at bar. With the situation under 
control, the officers could have guarded the car and obtained a 
warrant by telephone before the search. Two other Utah cases 
support this idea that if the place to be searched can be guarded 
(thereby preventing destruction of evidence and risk to officers or 
the public), the police must obtain a warrant before the search. 
State v. South, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1994) (exigent 
circumstances do not exist if officers can secure place to be 
searched and then obtain warrant for search); State v. Harrison, 
805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Harrison, although the search of a diaper bag in a baby 
stroller was upheld on other grounds (search incident to arrest), 
the Utah Court of Appeals suggested, in dicta, that if there was a 
way to secure the baby stroller at the scene, the officers would 
have to obtain a warrant before searching the diaper bag. The 
reason for this is that there was no longer any risk to officers 
because the suspect had been handcuffed and removed from the scene 
as in the case at bar. Harrison at 785. 
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B. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
There are several United States Constitution cases discussing 
probable cause and exigent circumstances which are on point. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 
(1982) (discussing the need for probable cause before a search); 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 
(1979) (when police have evidence securely within their control and 
there is no danger to themselves or risk of losing the evidence, a 
warrant must be obtained before a search is conducted); United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 
(1977) (police may not search footlocker without warrant even 
though probable cause existed for search; exigent circumstances did 
not exist where search was conducted more than an hour after 
federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and 
suspects were securely in custody). 
In the case at bar, the officers were not justified in 
conducting a weapons search of the vehicle. All suspects were 
handcuffed and unable to return to the car. Suspects were 
cooperative and no one made any furtive movements while seated in 
the car suggesting that there were weapons in the car. As such, a 
Terry frisk of the car was unwarranted because there was no 
reasonable suspicion to support the frisk, especially when the 
suspects had not been frisked first. The case at bar goes well 
beyond Stricklinq and should not be upheld on the basis of that 
case. 
Without justification for a Terry search, officers need 
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probable cause and exigent circumstances before a warrantless 
search can be conducted. In the case at bar, there were no exigent 
circumstances nor was there probable cause to search. Even if 
there was probable cause to search, without exigent circumstances, 
the officers should have obtained a warrant by telephone before 
conducting a search of the Barlow vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress 
for illegal search and seizure based upon arguments in Appellant's 
opening and reply briefs. 
SUBMITTED this iLtt day of March, 1995. 
risanne Gustin-Furgis 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellanv 
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